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Non-technical summary
Political representatives repeatedly argue that globalization might lead to a destructive
competition which would result in a “race to the bottom” of corporate tax rates and an
insufficient financial endowment of the public authorities. Setting minimum tax rates is
a way of mitigating this pressure from tax competition. In this paper, we explore the
factors which shape the support of politicians with respect to corporate tax coordination
in the EU. While there exists a vast literature on the controversial issue whether corpo-
rate tax coordination is capable of improving welfare or not as compared to unrestricted
competition, the positive question on the driving forces of harmonization processes has
largely been ignored. This paper contributes to filling this gap.
In a first step, a number of hypotheses are derived mainly from the theoretical tax com-
petition literature and different approaches from political science. Individual factors can
be derived from ideological preferences towards the role of the government and national
sovereignty as well as from the personal background such as education. Country-specific
factors mainly arise from different national preferences as well as from the extent to which
a country can benefit from the autonomy to pursue an independent tax policy.
In our empirical approach, we focus on a particularly interesting group, namely the Mem-
bers of the European Parliament (MEP) and make use of a self-conducted survey among
MEP, which included a question which deals directly with the desirability of EU-wide
obligatory minimum corporate tax rates. Moreover, this study makes additional use of
a similar survey of the Bundestag to analyse differences between the attitudes of na-
tional and European representatives. The results confirm an important role of ideology,
left-wing and pro-European politicians tend to favour minimum tax rates. But we also
demonstrate that both further individual characteristics as well as national interests are
important determinants for the politicians’ attitudes towards reducing tax competition by
means of minimum tax rates. Individual characteristics, such as education and the length
of membership in the EP, show the expected effect. National interests play an important
role as well, which is most notably the case for the current national level of corporate tax-
ation. Moreover, the citizens’ preference for social equality transpires to have an impact
on the politicians’ attitude towards tax competition, while some other predictions from
tax competition models seem to play a minor role. Our EP-Bundestag comparison shows
that German politicians on the national level do not show different preferences towards
tax rate harmonization.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Von Seiten der Politik wird ha¨ufig das Argument vorgebracht, dass die Globalisierung zu
einem scha¨dlichen Wettbewerb fu¨hre, der in einem “Abwa¨rts-Wettlauf” der Unternehmens-
steuersa¨tze und einer unzureichenden finanziellen Ausstattung der o¨ffentlichen Haushalte
resultieren wu¨rde. Die Einfu¨hrung von Mindeststeuersa¨tzen stellt eine Mo¨glichkeit dar,
den vom Steuerwettbewerb ausgehenden Druck abzuschwa¨chen. In diesem Papier un-
tersuchen wir die Faktoren, welche die Einstellung von Politikern gegenu¨ber einer Ko-
ordinierung der Unternehmensbesteuerung in der EU determinieren. Wa¨hrend eine um-
fangreiche Literatur zu der Frage existiert, ob eine Koordinierung der Unternehmens-
besteuerung in der Lage ist, eine Wohlfahrtssteigerung gegenu¨ber uneingeschra¨nktem
Wettbewerb herbeizufu¨hren, ist die positive Frage nach den Triebkra¨ften von Harmo-
nisierungsprozessen bisher weitestgehend ignoriert worden. Dieses Papier tra¨gt dazu bei,
diese Lu¨cke zu schließen.
In einem ersten Schritt werden Hypothesen abgeleitet, welche hauptsa¨chlich auf der
theoretischen Steuerwettbewerbsliteratur und verschiedenen Ansa¨tzen aus den Politik-
wissenschaften basieren. Individuelle Faktoren ko¨nnen hauptsa¨chlich von ideologischen
Pra¨ferenzen zur Rolle des Staates und der nationalen Souvera¨nita¨t sowie vom perso¨nlichen
Hintergrund, wie etwa Bildung, abgeleitet werden. Landesspezifische Faktoren entstam-
men von unterschiedlichen nationalen Pra¨ferenzen sowie von dem Ausmaß, in dem ein
Land von einer unabha¨ngigen nationalen Steuerpolitik profitieren kann.
In unserem empirischen Ansatz betrachten wir eine besonders interessante Gruppe, na¨mlich
die Mitglieder des Europa¨ischen Parlamentes (MdEP), und nutzen eine selbstdurchgefu¨hrte
Umfrage unter MdEPs, in der nach der Wu¨nschbarkeit von EU-weit verpflichtenden Min-
deststeuersa¨tzen fu¨r Unternehmen gefragt wurde. Zudem nutzt diese Studie eine a¨hnliche
Befragung unter Mitgliedern des Bundestages um Unterschiede zwischen Repra¨sentanten
auf nationaler und europa¨ischer Ebene zu untersuchen. Die empirischen Ergebnisse
besta¨tigen eine wichtige Rolle der Ideologie; linke und pro-europa¨ische Politiker neigen
dazu, Mindestbesteuerung zu bevorzugen. Aber wir zeigen, dass auch eine Reihe an in-
dividuellen Charakteristika, sowie nationale Interessen, wichtige Determinanten fu¨r die
Einstellung von Politikern gegenu¨ber einer Einschra¨nkung des Unternehmenssteuerwett-
bewerbs durch die Einfu¨hrung einer Mindestbesteuerung darstellen. Die individuellen
Charakteristika wie Bildung und La¨nge der Mitgliedschaft im EP zeigen die erwarteten
Ergebnisse. Nationale Interessen spielen ebenfalls eine bedeutende Rolle, was insbeson-
dere fu¨r das gegenwa¨rtige nationale Niveau der Unternehmensbesteuerung zutrifft. Wei-
terhin zeigt sich ein Einfluss der Pra¨ferenzen der Bu¨rger fu¨r soziale Gerechtigkeit auf
die Einstellung der Politiker gegenu¨ber Steuerwettbewerb, wa¨hrend andere Vorhersagen
aus Steuerwettbewerbsmodellen nur eine geringe Rolle zu spielen scheinen. Unser EP-
Bundestag-Vergleich zeigt, dass deutsche Politiker auf nationaler Ebene keine unter-
schiedlichen Pra¨ferenzen gegenu¨ber Unternehmenssteuerharmonisierung zeigen.
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1 Introduction
Corporate tax harmonization is a much discussed subject in politics. Supported by the
findings of neoclassical standard tax competition models, political representatives repeat-
edly argue that globalization might lead to a destructive competition which would result
in a “race to the bottom” of tax rates and an insufficient financial endowment of the public
authorities. However, an international coordination of corporate tax policies is difficult
in practice since individual actors may usually gain from a unilateral deviation of their
tax policy.
One existing supranational institution which could ensure a coordinated tax policy of a
subgroup of nations is the European Union. In Europe, there are pronounced concerns
about the consequences of corporate tax competition, especially since the accession of
central and eastern European countries with low corporate taxes to the EU. Although
the Ruding Report on Company Taxation (Commission of the European Communities
(1992)) already proposed to introduce an EU-wide obligatory corporate tax rate of 30%
in the year 1992, European legislators have been remarkably calm regarding advances in
this direction in the past years. Nevertheless, both in the political debate and in the eco-
nomic literature, it is still a debated issue whether the European level should get involved
in this area and restrict tax competition by means of an obligatory minimum corporate
tax rate.
While there exists a vast theoretical and empirical literature on the controversial issue
whether corporate tax coordination is capable of improving welfare or not as compared
to unrestricted competition, the positive question on the driving forces of harmonization
processes has largely been ignored. Despite the fact that a few authors (e.g., Frey and
Eichenberger (1996)) have formulated certain presumptions on the probable view of deci-
sion makers in parliaments, rigorous empirical tests on such hypotheses are missing. This
paper contributes to filling this gap. We want to explore the preference-shaping factors of
policy actors with respect to their position on corporate tax coordination in general and
on an EU-wide minimum tax in particular.
There are a number of factors which can be expected to influence preferences in this
regard, both on the individual and on the country-specific level. Individual factors can
mainly be derived from ideological preferences, as it may be assumed that the attitudes
towards the role of the government and national sovereignty have an influence; however,
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they can also be derived from personal background such as education. Country-specific
factors arise from different preferences towards the size of the national welfare state and
national tax autonomy, as well as the extent to which a country can benefit from the
autonomy to pursue an independent tax policy.
In our approach to identify possible driving motives behind different positions of politi-
cians towards corporate tax cooperation which are related to national characteristics, we
focus on a particularly interesting group, namely the Members of the European Parlia-
ment (MEP). Although these politicians do not have a direct say in the corporate tax
policies of today, they constitute an interesting subject of research. In contrast to na-
tional parliaments, where all parliamentarians share the same national perspective and
analyses can only focus on differences in ideology and individual background of the par-
liamentarians, in the EP perceptions from all 27 EU member states come together. This
allows us to disentangle the country interests from the influence of ideology which have
a combined effect on the attitude towards tax harmonization. For this purpose, we make
use of a unique data base: a self-conducted survey among MEPs, which asked directly
for the desirability of EU-wide obligatory minimum corporate tax rates. Moreover, this
study makes additional use of a similar survey, which was directed at members of the
German parliament, the Bundestag. This integrated use of surveys allows us to identify
differences between the attitudes of national and European representatives. Based on
these databases our study is the first to shed light on the positive question of how to
comprehend the diversity of attitudes of politicians on corporate tax competition in an
integrated economic area such as the EU.
The main results of this paper can be summarised as follows. The important role of ideol-
ogy can be confirmed, but we also demonstrate that both further individual characteristics
as well as national interests proxied by country variables are important determinants for
the politicians’ attitudes towards limiting corporate tax competition by means of minimum
tax rates. It is mainly parliamentarians from countries which exhibit a high corporate tax
burden today who express their approval for minimum tax rates. Several predictions of
theory derived from tax competition models can be confirmed, while others do not find
support. However, no evidence can be found that the attitude of German representatives
of the Bundestag differs from that of their counterparts in the European Parliament.
The structure of our paper is as follows: in section 2, the theoretical background for our
analysis is presented, which is mainly based on the literature on tax competition and
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on several approaches from the political science literature. On this basis, our testable
approach to preference formation is developed in section 3. In section 4, the surveys of
members of the European Parliament and the German Bundestag are described. Descrip-
tive findings are discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents the empirical analysis and the
estimation results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
The theoretical literature on tax coordination in the European Union, such as Zodrow
(2003) or Oates (2001), has until now mainly focussed on the normative question whether
coordination of tax policies is welfare-increasing compared to competition. Although we
want to switch over to a positive perspective, this normative literature lays some of the
foundations for the subsequent hypotheses concerning the politicians’ attitudes towards
tax coordination. In said literature, tax coordination gets its support from the view which
regards corporate tax competition as being detrimental, as it is often described as a “race
to the bottom”. Following this view, countries underbid each other’s corporate tax rates
in order to attract capital. An overall loss of welfare occurs where a coordinated approach
could yield a better result for all players. The typical result of these standard tax com-
petition models is a suboptimal low level of public expenditures (see, e.g., Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986)), which puts pressure on the welfare state and endangers its financing
base. In its application to EU tax policy, Zodrow (2003: 655) therefore concludes that
“the standard tax competition model suggests a potential role for tax rate harmonization
in a union”.
Compared to these models based on standard welfare theory, a further strand of literature
has a much more sceptical view on tax harmonization. In said literature, a standard result
is that tax harmonization can imply a reduction of welfare (for an overview, see Wilson
and Wildasin (2004)). The most famous argument from this side is the “Leviathan”
view of governments introduced by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). This view does not
assume benevolent governments as traditional tax models do, but instead governments
which are to a certain extent driven by the aim of budget maximization. In these mod-
els, tax competition can counteract their tendency to overspend (see, e.g., Edwards and
Keen (1996)), thus resulting in positive welfare effects. In this regard, two most recent
political-economic approaches are of relevance. Janeba and Schjelderup (forthcoming)
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derive conditions under which tax competition can be beneficial, depending on the voting
system and the kind of self-interest of the politicians. Eggert and Sørensen (2008) show in
a probabilistic voting model that tax competition may be welfare increasing as it reduces
wasteful rents to public employees. Finally, a similar result comes from Janeba (1998),
who shows that tax competition eliminates wasteful export subsidies, and thus increases
welfare.
In contrast to the bulk of the theoretical approaches, some further papers do not abstract
from the institutional design of tax harmonization, which is often simply modelled as a
coordinated tax increase in all countries. Instead, they consider minimum tax rates as
a specific form of tax policy coordination with high policy relevance as discussed above.
However, the results regarding the question whether a minimum level for taxation on the
supranational level can lead to a welfare improvement are usually ambiguous within the
framework of these theoretical tax competition models1. Moreover, Sørensen (2000) shows
with the help of an applied economic equilibrium model that a binding minimum capital
income tax rate in Western Europe would implicate an overall social net gain. However,
his simulations indicate that this gain will be unequally distributed, leading to a modest,
but still positive effect on the median voters’ welfare, and a higher gain for the poorest
citizens2.
In the following section 3, we will discuss some further aspects of seminal tax competition
models which are of importance to the derivation of our testable hypotheses, i.e., the im-
plications of asymmetric tax competition and new economic geography models. Overall,
the theoretical literature on the welfare effects of tax competition is so extensive that
a more comprehensive discussion would go beyond the scope of this paper. For more
complete surveys of the overall literature, please refer to Wilson and Wildasin (2004) or
Fuest et al. (2005).
The literature surveyed so far has a clearly normative perspective when evaluating the
welfare effects of tax competition and tax coordination. It looks at countries and their
tax policy decisions in a highly aggregate way and largely abstracts from individual po-
litical decision makers and their actual interests and constraints. In this respect, our
1Examples are Grazzini and van Ypersele (2003), Lo´pez, Marchand, and Pestieau (1998) and Fuest
and Huber (1999).
2Related literature on the welfare effects of minimum tax rates on commodity taxation comes to more
positive results (see Kanbur and M. Keen (1993)): in their model, both countries may gain from imposing
minimum tax rates compared to unrestricted competition, while full harmonization always leads to a loss
for one country.
4
study follows a distinctly different approach by trying to identify what shapes the tax
harmonization preferences of policy makers. In the political-economic literature there are
few related works. One notable exception are Frey and Eichenberger (1996), who argue
that members of parliament generally have an interest in the harmonization of tax policy,
as it enables them to form cartels in order to cement their importance and power.
With regard to parliamentary decision making, some special features of the European
Parliament are of interest as the group of MEPs is in the centre of our investigation in
order to disclose the role of national interests. The relevant empirical literature from
political science offers some first insights. This literature mainly centres on the question
whether MEPs vote along a (European) political group rather than along country lines.
Recent contributions in this area on past European Parliaments are mainly from Hix and
co-authors (see Hix (2002); Hix, Noury, and Roland (2007)). They empirically analyse
roll-call votes in the EP for different periods and find that party cohesion of voting be-
haviour in the EP clearly exceeds national cohesion. The most recent analysis of voting
behaviour in the first half of the Sixth European Parliament (2004-2005) shows that this
pattern has hardly changed even after the accession of the new member states (see Hix
and Noury (forthcoming)). Interestingly enough, the authors find that national cohesion
is relatively more important for budgetary votes which is a policy area with pronounced
national interests, while Aspinwall (2002) shows that the dominating role of party co-
hesion does not hold for policy areas with strong and heterogeneously defined national
interests such as foreign policy3. This suggests that in policy areas where a strong national
interest exists, a lower level of party cohesion in the EP may be expected. This finding is
of high relevance to the question at hand: as corporate tax policy is still regarded as an
unambiguous national instrument of policy, an intervention by the EU can easily conflict
with national interests.
Compared to the roll-call (i.e. recorded) vote literature, our direct survey of MEP pref-
erences has a clear advantage since it enables a direct identification of individual policy
preferences, whereas actual voting can be a highly distorted signal for preferences. It is
quite customary for parties to impose informal sanctions on their members for defecting
votes. Since only non-anonymous votes are open for empirical analysis, the resulting bias
should be substantial. In an accompanying paper which focuses directly on individual
3Unfortunately, separate analyses for tax related votes do not exist because the EP has hardly any
say in tax issues.
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policy preferences in the European Parliament, Heinemann et al. (forthcoming) make use
of other items of the same survey as this paper and analyse the EU parliamentarians’
attitudes towards the conceivable reform of the EU budget in general, and explicitly ex-
amine their attitudes towards the introduction of an EU tax. This analysis shows that for
this particular question, not only ideology plays a role, but also country interests. Among
these there is the financial net payer position, the new versus old member dimension and
a country’s tax competitiveness (for corporate taxation). This intrinsic conflict for an
MEP between national interest and individual ideological position paves the way for the
following analyses.
3 Tax Policy Preference Formation
The literature overview above gives us some first intuitions on the politicians’ attitudes
towards corporate tax coordination. The political economic perspective indicates that
there is a strong incentive to harmonize tax policies because – from that perspective –
politicians strive to form cartels in order to increase their room for manoeuvre. However,
major differences between representatives from different parliaments can be expected.
Specifically, one would expect the European Parliament as an institution to be in favour
of steps toward a harmonization of EU corporate taxation and to therefore approve of the
idea of introducing EU-wide obligatory minimum corporate tax rates. At the EU level,
minimum tax rates already exist for excise taxes and the value added tax, which has been
fixed since its introduction in 1992 at a level of 15%4. Its level is decided jointly every
two years by the Council after proposal of the European Commission and confirmation of
the EP. Regardless of how the institutional arrangement for corporate tax coordination
would actually look like, it would undoubtedly mean a shift of competencies from the
national level to the European level. As it is usually affirmed in the political science
literature that the EP tends to be pro-integrationist (see Scully (2005) for an overview),
it could be argued that to strive for an increase of tax policy coordination is in general
in the interest of the European Parliament. It is even more obvious that for the repre-
sentatives of the national parliaments the opposite should hold true, as these necessarily
4Minimum VAT rates are for two reasons hardly comparable with minimum corporate tax rates and
will not be discussed in this paper in further detail: 1. tax competition is of minor importance for
consumption goods than for capital due to lower mobility, and 2., the minimum VAT rate is set in the
EU at a very low level and many exemptions are granted, so that it is barely restrictive for the member
states.
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lose power in which way whatsoever the decision-making at the European level will be
arranged. Consequently, institutional self-interest suggests that support of EP members
should exceed the support of national representatives.
Nevertheless, we also expect a considerable degree of heterogeneity among MEPs on this
issue. As the theoretical literature shows, it is a very controversial issue – even among
economists – whether a coordination of corporate tax rates would be welfare improving
in the EU, or not. However, even in case of a potential overall welfare increase through
tax harmonization, this might be difficult to implement in the real world. It would be
difficult to create a compensation mechanism favouring those countries which benefit from
a unilateral deviation of their tax policy (see Brøchner et al. (2007)). According to the
view of many tax competition models, a politician’s attitude would then depend on his
jurisdiction’s median voter preferences. This would imply that he will support harmo-
nization in case the median voter benefits from it compared to the status quo, and reject
it otherwise.
However, various contributions both from economic and political science analysing leg-
islators’ decision-making reject the idea of “purely economic theories of voting” which
is explicitly or implicitly made on the basis of most theoretical approaches in tax com-
petition models, which in most cases build up on the assumption that politicians aim
at maximizing the utility of a representative household or the median voter. Poole and
Rosenthal (1996), who analyse the voting behaviour in the US Senate, term this ap-
proach to decision-making the “principal-agent” approach. In this view, the politicians
are agents who act on behalf of their principal with the aim to maximize their utility
mainly by striving for re-election. In these models, the principal is usually modelled as
the median voter of the representative’s constituency, but he can also be a particularly well
organised interest group, for instance. In addition to that, Poole and Rosenthal (1996)
identify a second class of explanations, which can be termed the “ideological” approach.
With the “ideological” perspective (which is much more common in political science than
in economics), a politician’s position is described on a certain ideological continuum. The
classical example for such a continuum is the range from left to right; another one which
is of high relevance for European politics is the range from pro to contra European inte-
gration. Thus, a politician’s location along that specific dimension should determine his
preferences or voting behaviour.
In addition to the interests of the constituency and the ideological position, individual
7
characteristics are a further determinant in preference formation. Studies on the forma-
tion of economic beliefs (e.g. Caplan (2002); Blendon et al. (1997)) suggest that education
or socio-economic characteristics of an individual can play a role, while Heinemann and
Janeba (2007) show that this is also relevant for belief formation of members of a par-
liament. This also implies that a MEP’s field of specialisation should matter, because
members of the committee responsible for economic affairs (“Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs” in the EU, ECON) might have a different view on issues such as
tax policy.
These different approaches to belief formation imply that the general preference of a
politician on the desirability of coordination of EU corporate tax policy in general, and
EU-wide obligatory minimum corporate tax rates in particular, should depend on the
following factors:
a) individual characteristics which are related to the individual politician’s education,
his informative situation linked, e.g., to his field of policy specialisation or socioeconomic
characteristics such as age or gender,
b) his/her ideological position according to the “ideological approach”,
c) member-state characteristics are a proxy for (potential) national benefits from tax har-
monization which are relevant to the interests of national voters who are represented by
the MEP according to the “principal-agent approach”.
In the following, we can formulate several hypotheses on the determinants of the prefer-
ences of the MEPs in light of this theory.
3.1 Individual characteristics
Predictions connected to individual characteristics of parliamentarians can predominantly
be derived from the political science literature. Of major interest are thereby the special
characteristics of members of the European Parliament. As one of the decisive individ-
ual characteristics, a socialization effect of MEPs is generally assumed. In many works
of political science literature, preferences of MEPs are not regarded to be exogenously
determined and stable, but that the affiliation in the EP changes their attitudes in line
with the institution’s view (see Scully (2005)). As discussed above, it is assumed that it
is one of the EP’s objectives to extend the centralization of policies at the European level.
From this institutional socialization effect, we can derive a first prediction on the MEPs’
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attitudes towards EU-wide minimum statutory tax rates:
H1a The support for tax coordination increases with the number of years spent in the EP.
Moreover, as national delegates have to fear a loss of tax autonomy at the expense of
the European level which would result from tax coordination at the EU level, we can infer
that there are significant differences between MEPs and representatives in the national
parliaments:
H1b Representatives from a national parliament should be less supportive of obligatory
minimum corporate tax rates than their counterparts from the European Parliament.
Additionally, the effect of expertise in business and economics is interesting. As dis-
cussed above, no clear-cut conclusion can be drawn in theory whether harmonization of
corporate taxation in the EU would be welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing. However,
in the past the welfare-improving view prevailed, so that Frey and Eichenberger (1996)
expect that economists tend to have a bias towards harmonization. However, it can be
expected that this view has changed since then, especially after the publication of the
paper by Edwards and Keen (1996) which was the first to bring together the contrasting
views of the benevolent and the non-benevolent decision-maker in a common framework.
Moreover, the expectation of a negative attitude of economists towards tax coordination
can be justified by the observation that this population group is generally more supportive
of competition and deregulation than other groups. This is shown by Caplan (2002) based
on survey data for the U.S., as well as by Dreher et al. (2008), who show that, among
500 political leaders from 73 countries, the group of trained economists has significantly
introduced more market liberal reforms than the rest. These more recent findings give
support to the following expectation:
H1c Representatives who have a final degree in economics or business administration
are expected to have a negative attitude towards tax harmonization.
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3.2 Ideological position
As discussed above, political science literature puts a lot of effort into the measurement of
ideological positions and their implications for decision making and party cohesion. The
approaches to measurement of ideological positions are manifold: they are inter alia calcu-
lated from roll-call votes, expert surveys and wording of party manifestos. Generally, the
left-right scale is found to be of decisive character in the mapping of ideological positions.
This dimension is also of high relevance for the matter of tax competition, as the border
between left and right positions runs along their attitudes toward the economic role of
public policy (see Benoit and Laver (2006)): left-wing representatives show more support
for redistribution and a larger welfare state, while right-wing representatives are more
inclined to lower taxation and a liberal, “laissez faire” economic policy. From this differ-
entiation in the views towards the role of the state, it can easily be derived that left-wing
politicians have to be more worried that tax competition might result in a deterioration
of public revenues, as standard tax models suggest, which leads us to the following hy-
pothesis:
H2a Left-wing representatives tend to be more supportive of minimum corporate tax
rates than right-wing representatives.
With regard to the European Parliament, a further dimension has been found to be
of major importance in political science, which is the attitude towards European integra-
tion measured on an anti-/ pro-Europe policies scale (see Hix and Noury (forthcoming)).
Politicians defined as anti-Europe refuse the transfer of additional competencies to the
European level. Therefore, they have to be worried that minimum corporate tax rates are
a first step to a centralization of tax policies, and thus a reduction of national sovereignty.
This gives us the following additional hypothesis for the ideology of MEPs:
H2b Representatives who show an anti-Europe attitude tend to have a more opposing
view towards obligatory minimum corporate tax rates.
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3.3 Country characteristics
As discussed in section 2, the relevant theoretical literature regarding tax competition is
mainly of a normative character, discussing the welfare effects of tax competition com-
pared to different kinds of harmonization. Nevertheless, these findings allow us to draw
some conclusions for the question at hand, i.e., which national characteristics are im-
portant for the national voters’ attitudes towards tax competition and thus shape the
attitude of politicians who act as their principals.
A first aspect in this regard deals with the voters’ perceptions of the likely consequences
of unrestricted tax competition as predicted by standard tax competition models. As
Sinn (1994) remarks, declining public revenues as a consequence of tax competition es-
pecially threaten the sustainability of pure systems of income redistribution. However,
the attitude towards income redistribution does not only differ depending on the position
at the left-right spectre at the individual level, but also systematically between countries
(see, e.g., Corneo and Gru¨ner (2002), or Alesina and Angeletos (2005)), which gives rise
to different perceptions of the costs of tax competition. Citizens of countries with high
preferences for income redistribution would suffer most from a downwards pressure on na-
tional tax revenues, as they would have to fear that this might result in a level of welfare
expenditures which is suboptimal low from their perspective. This consideration leads to
the following hypothesis on the politicians’ attitudes:
H3a Representatives from countries where the citizens have a high preference for social
equality tend to be more supportive of minimum corporate tax rates.
Early extensions of the classic Zodrow-Mieszkowski framework gave up their assumption
of symmetric countries, but emphasized the importance of asymmetries in population.
Seminal models with asymmetries in the population introduced by Bucovetsky (1991)
and Wilson (1991) demonstrate the advantages of small regions in situations where tax
competition exists.
This led to a literature which disputed the view that tax coordination eventually leads to
all countries being better off as implied by the prisoner’s dilemma model. As Dehejia and
Genschel (1999) show in their model, small countries might gain from tax competition.
This is the case because they can attract a large fraction of foreign tax base through a
rate cut, while the national revenue loss is rather low due to its small domestic tax base.
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Consider the following hypothesis derived from tax competition models with asymmetric
country size:
H3b Representatives from small countries should oppose minimum corporate tax rates
more strongly than their counterparts from larger countries.
One further more recent view towards tax competition comes from “new economic geog-
raphy” models, which introduce the “agglomeration” argument (Baldwin and Krugman
(2004)). According to this, firms tend to cluster together in higher developed regions or
countries (“core countries”) due to positive externalities of spatial concentration. This en-
ables these countries to sustain a higher tax burden on companies than the less-developed
countries in the periphery, as the former do not have to fear capital outflows due to
their agglomeration advantages. This implicates that the core countries would be able
to increase their agglomeration tax rents in case tax competition was reduced. In the
Baldwin/Krugman model the introduction of a tax floor would benefit the core countries,
as these can increase their agglomeration rents through an even higher level of taxation
than without any coordination. We propose:
H3c Representatives from countries which exhibit high agglomeration effects tend to be
more supportive of obligatory minimum corporate tax rates.
Furthermore, the current level of corporate taxation in a country can be expected to
be of importance. Countries which exhibit a high level of corporate taxation even today
would not be affected by a minimum tax rate as soon as their current tax rate is higher.
They would even benefit from it as it reduces the gap to other countries which exhibit low
tax rates today. This would eventually reduce the stress of competition on their economy.
Peralta and van Ypersele (2006) show analytically in a tax competition model that min-
imum tax rates are never unanimously accepted because they would cause an increase in
the gross price of capital in the bound countries, thus, making these countries lose from
it, although leading to an overall increase of production.
The incentive of a majority of highly taxed countries to impose their level of taxation on
the minority of low taxed countries in a federation in order to decrease their competi-
tiveness is closely related to the “strategy of raising rivals’ costs”, which is known from
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the political economy of industrial organization (see Vaubel (2006)). This leads us to the
following hypothesis:
H3d Representatives from countries which currently exhibit a high tax burden on compa-
nies tend to be supportive of obligatory minimum corporate tax rates.
One further aspect derived from tax competition models concerns the mobility of capital.
Apparently, the degree of competition a country is exposed to, and hence its attitude
towards tax harmonization, largely depends on the mobility of its local capital stock.
Carlsen, Langset, and Rattsø (2005) formalize this claim and show analytically that low
mobility of the local industry alleviates the pressure a jurisdiction faces from tax competi-
tion and leads to a higher tax level5. As real capital is not as mobile as other investments,
countries with a high share of real capital are expected not to be exposed to corporate
tax competition to the same degree as other countries, so that they have less to gain from
a retrenchment of tax competition through minimum tax rates. The following hypothesis
results:
H3e Representatives from countries with a high share of real capital tend to be less
supportive of obligatory minimum corporate tax rates.
Apart from these predictions derived from various tax competition models, one further
hypothesis regarding national interests, which should have an impact within the principal-
agent approach, can be made. This is directly linked to the voters’ attitudes towards
European integration in general and European tax competencies in particular. Apart
from the economic advantages and disadvantages discussed so far, the citizens in the EU
member states can also be expected to differ in their attitudes towards tax coordination
due to different preferences for European integration or diverging national preferences
regarding taxation. According to the principal-agent approach, a politician who is con-
cerned about his re-election will not only incorporate the “economic” national advantages
and disadvantages of tax coordination in his decision, but the subjective preferences of
his constituency as well. Therefore, we propose:
5Empirically, the authors confirm that Norwegian municipalities which experience high firm mobility
tend to have a lower level of taxation.
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H3f Representatives from countries whose citizens express antipathy towards an increase
of competencies of the European level in the area of taxation tend to be less supportive
of obligatory minimum corporate tax rates.
It is the objective of the following empirical part to test for the actual relevance of these
hypotheses based on our survey results.
4 Survey descriptions
The first survey which we will refer to was conducted by the authors among the members
of the European Parliament between March and July 2007. The parliamentarians were
addressed with written letters, which were sent out in five different languages: German,
French, Polish, Spanish, and English. Where available, MEPs were addressed with letters
and questionnaires in their mother tongue or in English otherwise. We received responses
from 158 members who filled out their questionnaires. The overall response rate was 20.1
per cent and differed significantly between political groups and countries (see Appendix,
Tables 6 and 7). We received responses from all but two small member countries (Estonia
and Malta).
The question which we exploit in the next sections is the following:
Question:What is your attitude towards the following statement: “The EU should agree
on EU-wide obligatory minimum corporate tax rates”?
The answer scale ranged from -4 (“very negative”) to +4 (”very positive”).
In addition to this survey, a second survey will be consulted, which was conducted be-
tween November 2006 and February 2007 among representatives in the German parliament
(Bundestag), and allows us to disclose differences in the attitudes of politicians at the Eu-
ropean and the national level6. In this survey, a question regarding the desirability of
EU-wide obligatory minimum corporate tax rates was included as well. As this question
was formulated almost with the identical wording and had the same scale, it is highly
comparable to the question at hand. This enables us to analyse two different data sets:
6That survey mainly focussed on the politicians’ perceptions of restrictions to tax policy due to
globalization (for details, see Heinemann and Janeba (2007)).
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first, only the responses from the members of the European Parliament in order to uncover
the impact of national interests, and second, a pooled sample of responses from German
politicians, both from the EP and the Bundestag, to disentangle differences between both
parliaments.
5 Descriptive findings
A visual inspection of the survey results from both samples shows a highly polarized atti-
tude towards minimum tax rates (see figure 1). The two prevalent answer categories are
the two extremes, either complete rejection or complete approval. This pattern is even
more pronounced for the EP sample concerning the negative answer categories. Table
1 presents the corresponding descriptive statistics of our analysis. As can been taken
from the total mean value of +0.22, the politicians are altogether in favour of a minimum
EU-wide obligatory corporation tax rate but only rather modestly. The large standard
deviation points to a substantial heterogeneity of views among the politicians, which puts
our analysis on a sound basis (total std. dev.: 3.14).
Figure 1: Distribution of answers (in per cent of all answers)
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Table 1: Comparisons of means, EP participants
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Classified by country
AT 7 2.57 2.94 -4 4
BE 6 2.17 3.13 -4 4
CZ 5 -2.20 2.68 -4 2
DE 39 0.51 2.89 -4 4
FR 16 1.25 2.74 -4 4
GB 12 -2.00 3.44 -4 4
HU 5 2.00 0.71 1 3
IT 8 1.75 1.39 0 3
PL 10 -2.60 2.37 -4 2
PT 7 2.86 1.46 0 4
Other1 41 -0.46 3.19 -4 4
Total 156 0.22 3.14 -4 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0000
Classified by political group
ALDE 18 -0.11 3.43 -4 4
EPP-ED 53 -0.72 3.10 -4 4
GUE-NGL 5 1.40 2.41 -1 4
IND/DEM 7 -3.71 0.76 -4 -2
IST 4 1.00 3.83 -4 4
NI 3 -4.00 0.00 -4 -4
PES 50 2.02 2.02 -4 4
Greens-EFA 6 3.17 1.17 1 4
UEN 10 -1.80 2.94 -4 3
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0000
Classified by accession date (2004)
EU-15 120 0.7 3.07 -4 4
new members 36 -1.36 2.86 -4 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0005
Classified by final degree in business admin. or economics
Yes 40 -0.65 3.25 -4 4
No 115 0.50 3.06 -4 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0449
1 only countries with number of observations ≥ 5 are listed individually
Comparing means among different indicators uncovers interesting first insights: the
preferences for minimum tax rates differ with high significance across countries as well
as political groups. Strong opponents of the country classification come from Poland,
the Czech Republic, and the UK. Strong proponents come from Portugal, Austria, and
Belgium. Politically speaking, the minimum taxation is mostly refused by politicians
belonging to parties that either want to retain the national sovereignty (UEN) or are
simply opposed to the EU and to any further integration (IND/DEM)7. As expected, the
7Indicative ideological positions are stated in table 6 in the appendix. A comprehensive overview of
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Table 2: Comparisons of means, EP and Bundestag participants
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Classified by political group
FDP (ALDE) 36 -2.31 2.56 -4 4
CDU/CSU (EPP-ED) 72 -0.54 2.73 -4 4
Die Linke (GUE/NGL) 29 3.28 1.13 0 4
SPD (PES) 42 2.67 1.82 -2 4
Bu¨ndnis 90/ Die Gru¨nen
(The Greens/EFA) 15 2.40 1.12 0 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0000
Classified by final degree in business admin. or economics
Yes 40 -0.55 3.26 -4 4
No 154 0.93 2.91 -4 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0058
Classified by origin from Eastern Germany
Yes 38 .61 2.80 -4 4
No 156 0.38 3.05 -4 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0259
Classified by member of European Parliament
Yes 39 0.51 2.89 -4 4
No 155 0.65 3.08 -4 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.7994
minimum taxation receives the most support from politicians of left-wing parties, namely
Greens-EFA, the socialist PES, and the GUE-NGL (the most far-left party group in the
EP). Surprisingly, the mean closest to zero is generated by the liberal ALDE group; the
members from the Christian democrat/conservative EPP-ED group are slightly opposed
to the idea of minimum corporate tax rates.
Classified by the accession date of the politicians’ country of origin (i.e., EU15-member
states vs. new members), it is noticeable that new member states politicians clearly op-
pose the minimum taxation. This might be due to the fact that the new member states
today have a low level of corporate taxation, or the lower socialization effect of their
MEPs. Politicians with a final degree in economics or business administration slightly
oppose the minimum taxation, while those with an other educational background are
slightly in favour of it.
The results for the pooled data set consisting of the German members of the Bundestag
and the EP are shown in table 2. Here, the German members of the liberal ALDE group,
the FDP, show by far the strongest opposition towards minimum tax rates. Again, the
left parties (SPD, Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen, Die Linke) offer much support for tax coordi-
nation. An interesting conclusion can be drawn from the standard deviations: these are
the political groups in the EP can be found in Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton (2007)
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in all cases lower than in the EP, which indicates that the cohesion of preferences within
the groups of the EP is smaller than that within the German parties.
Parliamentarians with a final degree in business administration or economics again offer
less support for minimum tax rates, which confirms the results for the EP. Politicians
from Eastern Germany are more supportive; this, however, can also be due to the fact
that the overwhelming majority of politicians of the left-wing party Die Linke come from
this part of the country. Finally, judged from the very high p-Value for the F-Test for
equal attitudes, there is no significant difference between the preferences of members of
the EP and members of the Bundestag observable from descriptive statistics.
6 Econometric testing
In the following, multivariate testing aims at identifying the relevant drivers of the EU
parliamentarians’ preferences towards corporate tax coordination by means of EU-wide
obligatory minimum rates, and at disentangling the attitudes of politicians of the EU level
and politicians at a national level in this regard.
Method
In the following empirical analyses, an ordered probit approach will be applied. This
approach is appropriate, as the answers on the question under investigation were made
on a scale from -4 to +4 (“very negative” to “very positive”).
An apparent problem of our econometric procedure, which is generally connected to sur-
vey data, is the selection bias. In empirical political science literature, the problem of
missing data in expert surveys has received much attention. However, as King et al.
(2001) point out, these concerns mainly relate to “item non-response”, i.e., respondents
answer some of the questions and not others. In this case, missing data can cause serious
biases. However, our missing data problem is exclusively due to “unit non-response”,
which means that some of the chosen sample individuals refuse to be interviewed (in our
survey, practically all respondents answered the tax minimum tax question). King et al.
(2001) specify that unlike item non-response, unit non-responses usually do not introduce
much bias into analyses.
Nevertheless, we have to take this issue seriously as our data set may not be representative
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of the underlying population, which may be inferred from the response rates which differ
both between member states as well as between party groups. However, since we are in-
terested in conditional effects (such as the impact of national characteristics or ideology),
the use of regression techniques takes account of these inconveniences. Biased results may
only emerge in the special case of an unobservable variable driving the response rate and
of this variable being correlated with an included explanatory variable. However, similar
to most other empirical research designs, we cannot exclude this problem, but we do not
see any theoretical indication why this should be the case in our empirical design. More-
over, our set of explanatory variables covers a wide spectrum of aspects, so that this risk
should be limited.
Nevertheless, in the analysis for the EP we apply a weighted estimator where weights
correct for the sample’s selection bias with respect to both country and political group
representation. This means that underrepresented observations receive a larger weight
than overrepresented cases. Furthermore, we allow for clustering of error terms among
MEPs from one political group to cope with problems from the possible omission of nonob-
servable determinants.
Variable Definition
According to our hypotheses formulated above, we make use of variables along three
dimensions, which comprise political group membership (according to the “ideological
approach”), individual characteristics (which quantify experience, education, or political
specialization) and country characteristics (which depict specific national interests accord-
ing to the “principal-agent approach”). Moreover, in addition to those variables which
are under investigation, several control variables are introduced which mainly capture
individual characteristics for which no clear relation to theory can be found.
In our testing, we make use of the following variables8:
Ideology:
The variables concerning ideology dimensions are taken from the political science liter-
ature on the measurement of ideology. They provide a more straightforward analysis of
the hypotheses on ideology than a simple use of party dummies. The individual scores
for the members of the EP are taken from Hix and Noury (forthcoming), who analyse the
8The sources can be found in tables 8 and 9 in the appendix.
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roll call votes from the first half of the sixth European Parliament and apply a scaling
technique to the individual voting behaviour9. These enable us to test the hypotheses
regarding the politicians’ ideologies directly10. The two variables assess each MEP’s ide-
ology concerning the two dimensions left/right and anti-/pro-Europe based on his voting
behaviour (recorded roll-call votes) in the first half of the sixth European Parliament:
left/right measures the general left-right dimension, ranging from -1 (left) to +1 (right);
anti-/pro-Europe reflects the attitude towards European integration with the same scale
(-1: anti-Europe; +1: pro-Europe).
Moreover, a measure of national party group positions from Benoit and Laver (2006) is
used in the empirical analysis. For the Bundestag, no individual data on the ideological
positions of the representatives is available, so for the sample of all German represen-
tatives only this measure can be used. Compared to the Hix/Noury measure presented
above, this measure is different in its composition: it is based on expert interviews and
not on the purely technical analysis of roll-call votes. However, this data has the advan-
tage that it offers more dimensions than the two dimensions of the Hix/Noury data set.
In addition to the general left-right definition (left/right (party)) focussing not only on
economic but also on social grounds (such as abortion or homosexuality), a more spe-
cific series asks for the location of each party on an economic policy dimension. This
dimension (taxes vs. spending (party)) refers to the substantive extremes of “promoting
raising taxes to increase public services” and “promoting cutting public services to cut
taxes”, which exactly conforms to our expected main ideological driver for tax harmo-
nization preferences11. In addition, the party groups’ views towards European integration
(anti-/pro-Europe (party)) are included as well in the Benoit/Laver data set, in which one
dimension (denoted as “EU authority” in their book) focuses on the attitude towards an
increase of the range of areas in which the EU can set the policy agenda. All dimensions
are measured on a scale ranging from zero (left and anti-EU, respectively) to twenty (right
and integration friendly, respectively)12.
9The values for ten 10 MEPs are missing in the Hix/Noury-dataset. Instead, the values for the average
of the respective country’s party group members were inserted.
10In addition, it was experimented with party group dummies as a proxy for ideology. The results
regarding the effects of membership in different party groups confirm the descriptive findings; the overall
results for the other variables remain constant.
11Few missing values had to be replaced by the values for the respective party group in the EP from
McElroy and Benoit (2007) which applies the same methodology.
12The anti-/pro-Europe (party) variable had to be rescaled to be comparable with the EP dataset, as
in the original contribution a high value indicates an anti-EU attitude.
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Individual characteristics, education and information:
Apparently, the socialization effect can best be captured by the length of membership in
parliament (Years in EP). In addition, Member of ECON committee, the EP committee
on economic and monetary affairs, has been added; this dummy points at the specializa-
tion of MEPs in the domain of tax policy and can also be seen as a proxy for socialization.
Members of this committee are expected to show more involvement in the ambition of
the European level to obtain additional competencies in the area of tax policy. For the
members of the Bundestag, the dummy takes the value of one for members of its pendant
to ECON, the “Finanzausschuss”.
The dummy Business/Economic studies takes the value of one for MEPs who declare in
their CVs (available on the website of the EP) to have studied business administration
or economics. This can be regarded as an expert effect, as these MEPs should have in-
formative advantages with respect to the scientific debate concerning tax competition as
well as with respect to economics in general.
Age and gender of the parliamentarians are added as control variables; with respect to
these personal characteristics we do not have particular expectations about the sign of
the effects.
Country characteristics:
The hypotheses formulated with regard to the principal-agent approach are tested by
means of several national characteristics. National preference for redistribution and so-
cial equality is proxied by representative survey results from Eurobarometer (European
Commission (2007b)). The variable Preference for social equality reflects the share of
citizens who answered in the survey that “social equality and solidarity” is a value to be
preserved and reinforced the most, above other values, such as peace, cultural diversity
or entrepreneurship, for instance. Hence, the point of reference of this indicator is not the
current level of social equality in the society (Then, the question would be “Do you want
more or less equality than today?”), but it is rather an abstract preferential comparison
with other positive societal values.
For the corporate tax burden, we employ statutory corporate income tax rates (CITR).
We also experimented with effective average tax rates (EATR) which are calculated by
the ZEW Mannheim for a profitable investment project (see Overesch (2005)). These
take account of both statutory tax rates and the detailed provisions of the tax law such
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as depreciation provisions according to the model of Devereux and Griffith (1999). While
the latter is a more accurate measure for the tax burden, the former is probably more
familiar to politicians and can be expected to have a higher impact on their perceptions.
However, due to the high correlation between these two measures, the results do not vary
significantly. Moreover, the measure Other revenues is added, which reflects the amount
that indirect taxes, social contributions and further revenues contribute to the national
budget as a share of GDP. This variable reflects the national dependency on the revenues
from corporate taxation, as it can be expected that a country which covers a bigger part
of its public expenditure through indirect taxes does not have to worry about corporate
tax competition to the same degree.
The agglomeration argument is analyzed by means of a self-constructed national accessi-
bility measure. This is defined as the population-weighted average of potential accessibility
by road of the regions within the respective country. The underlying indicator from the
European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON (2007)) can be regarded as a
proxy for the size of the market area which the local producers within a certain region are
faced with13. To account for differences in the stock of real capital, the gross value added
(GVA) of industry as share of the total GVA (whose lion’s share is the contribution of
the services sector) is used (GVA industry). The size of the countries is captured by the
number of inhabitants (Size)14.
The variable national support for EU tax responsibility is measured by means of a survey
conducted by Eurobarometer, which asked citizens in the member states whether decisions
in the area of taxation should be made by the national governments, or jointly within
the European Union (European Commission (2007a)). The variable reflects the national
share of responses in favour of decisions being made jointly within the European Union.
As a further control variable, a dummy for EU-15 (EU-15 member) was introduced. The
twelve new member states, mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, have common prop-
erties related to their relatively short historical experience of political autonomy, which
is probably also relevant for their view on tax competition. It might be expected that
13In particular, the value of the indicator is calculated by summing up the population of all European
regions weighted by the time needed to travel there by car in the basis year 2006. This value is then
standardized by dividing it by the European average, which is set at 100; see Vickerman, Spiekermann,
and Wegener (1999) for an overview of accessibility indicators. The regional values vary from 1.3 for Do-
decanese (a peripheric Greek archipelago) to 235.4 for the city of Leverkusen in North Rhine-Westphalia,
Germany.
14It has also been experimented with the total national GDP as an indicator for a country’s size; the
results do not differ much due to the high correlation between the two variables.
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these countries are particularly keen on retaining their tax autonomy, so that the sign of
the dummy for the old member states is expected to be positive. Finally, national wealth
is added as a control variable; it is proxied by the GDP per capita in purchasing power
(GDP per capita) in 2006.
Results
In tables 3 to 4, the results for the dataset containing the members from the EP are de-
picted. The dependent variable are the answers to the question concerning the desirability
of EU-wide obligatory minimum corporate tax rates as presented in section 4. Specifica-
tions (1) to (5) differ with respect to the included country variables: in regression (1), no
country variables are included. In regression (2), all country variables are included, and
in (3), country variables of (2) which turn out to be insignificant at the 10% level are ex-
cluded. As some of the hypotheses presented above suggest that the CITR is affected by
several of the other exogenous country variables, the problem of multicollinearity might
appear. Therefore, this variable is excluded in specification (4) due to the possibility
of multicollinearity. In (5), the non-significant variables from (4) are excluded. Finally,
specification (6) uses different data to measure ideologies as will be explained below.
A highly significant impact of ideology on preferences for EU tax coordination can be
found as a robust result of all specifications. The results confirm our assumptions: In
all specifications, the left/right dimension is highly significant, indicating that MEPs
with a left-wing ideology are more supportive of tax harmonization than those with a
right-wing ideology. However, one has to bear in mind that this rough measure of the
left/right-dimension (which is more of a technical nature as discussed above) does not
only incorporate the politician’s view towards the role of the state in the area of eco-
nomics (economic policy left/right dimension), but also his view towards social policy,
so that these two dimensions partly interfere with each other on the general left/right
dimension. To disentangle these effects, in specification (6) the survey-based values for
the ideological positions of the national parties from Benoit and Laver (2006) are used15.
The two measures for the left-right dimension are jointly different from zero with a very
high significance (p-value: 0.000). However, only the measure concerning the economic
policy position taxes vs. spending appears individually significant in the regression.
15Unfortunately, data for the positions towards European integration is not consistently available from
the Benoit and Laver (2006) data set for most countries.
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Table 3: Regression results for European Parliament
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coefficient Marg. effect Coefficient Marg. effect Coefficient Marg. effect
Ideology
left/right -1.873*** -0.450 -2.200*** -0.400 -2.121*** -0.413
(0.529) (0.680) (0.650)
anti-/pro-Europe 0.683*** 0.164 0.424* 0.079 0.454* 0.088
(0.166) (0.219) (0.238)
left/right (party) - - - - - -
Taxes vs. spending (party) - - - - - -
Further individual characteristics
Age 0.013* 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.001
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
Gender (male) -0.624* -0.174 -0.463 -0.100 -0.455 -0.102
(0.358) (0.383) (0.313)
Years in EP 0.064** 0.015 0.071*** 0.013 0.058*** 0.011
(0.025) (0.021) (0.020)
Member of ECON committee 0.589*** 0.165 0.587*** 0.133 0.606*** 0.144
(0.131) (0.144) (0.170)
Business / Economic studies -0.537*** -0.117 -0.474** -0.080 -0.438** -0.078
(0.185) (0.194) (0.223)
Country characteristics
CITR - - 8.209*** 1.525 4.985** 0.971
(3.143) (1.950)
Preference for social equality - - 6.156*** 1.143 5.067** 0.987
(1.428) (2.389)
Size - - -0.369*** -0.068 -0.298* -0.058
(0.138) (0.156)
GDP per capita - - -0.006 -0.001 - -
(0.007)
Accessibility - - 0.001 0.000 - -
(0.004)
GVA industry - - -0.084*** -0.015 -0.066*** -0.013
(0.017) (0.015)
EU-15 member - - -0.534 -0.118 - -
(0.410)
other revenues - - -4.910 -0.912 -3.866* -0.753
(3.859) (2.166)
National support of EU tax - - 0.972 0.181 - -
responsibilities (1.515)
Regression Diagnostics
Observations 156 156 156
Prob chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PseudoR2 0.1442 0.2202 0.2087
Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for an obligatory minimum tax rate).
The anti-/pro-Europe dimension is in line with expectations as well: politicians with
a more pro-Europe attitude are more in favour of minimum tax rates than opponents
of European integration. Interestingly enough, the marginal effects of the two ideology
variables show pronounced quantitative differences. In most specifications, the marginal
effect of the left/right dimension is more than 4 times higher than the marginal effect
of the pro-/anti-EU dimension, which suggests that the former is of decisive importance
for the MEP’s attitude. The marginal effects can be interpreted as follows: a shift of 1
point on the left-right axis (which is approximately the gap between the German post-
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Table 4: Regression results for European Parliament (continued)
(4) (5) (6)
Variable Coefficient Marg. effect Coefficient Marg. effect Coefficient Marg. effect
Ideology
left/right -2.223*** -0.423 -1.986*** -0.409 - -
(0.651) (0.562)
anti-/pro-Europe 0.372* 0.071 0.419** 0.086 - -
(0.215) (0.186)
left/right (party) - - - - -0.057 -0.011
(0.051)
Taxes vs. spending (party) - - - - -0.071* -0.014
(0.043)
Further individual characteristics
Age 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Gender (male) -0.513 -0.115 -0.567 -0.138 -0.529 -0.126
(0.396) (0.404) (0.406)
Years in EP 0.071*** 0.014 0.065*** 0.013 0.079*** 0.016
(0.024) (0.021) (0.023)
Member of ECON committee 0.604*** 0.141 0.617*** 0.154 0.500*** 0.119
(0.153) (0.215) (0.182)
Business / Economic studies -0.483*** -0.083 -0.502** -0.094 -0.423*** -0.079
(0.179) (0.223) (0.153)
Country characteristics
CITR - - - - 9.517** 1.933
(4.083)
Preference for social equality 6.635*** 1.263 5.348** 1.102 8.303*** 1.687
(1.550) (2.312) (1.558)
Size -0.205 -0.039 - - -0.370*** -0.075
(0.129) (0.106)
GDP per capita -0.009 -0.002 - - -0.002 -0.000
(0.008) (0.007)
Accessibility 0.004* 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
GVA industry -0.076*** -0.014 -0.065*** -0.013 -0.080*** -0.016
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
EU-15 member 0.473 0.077 - - -0.736* -0.185
(0.510) (0.422)
other revenues -4.731 -0.901 - - -4.295 -0.872
(4.326) (3.785)
National support of EU tax 1.851 0.352 - - 1.570 0.319
responsibilities (1.937) (1.959)
Regression Diagnostics
Observations 156 156 153
Prob chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PseudoR2 0.2108 0.1948 0.2100
Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for an obligatory minimum tax rate).
communist PDS and the British Conservatives) to the left increases the probability by
around 40% of stating a high support for minimum tax rates. Correspondingly, a shift of
1 point upwards on the anti-/pro-Europe axis (which is about the difference between the
EU-skeptic UEN group and the Social Democrats) increases the probability by around
8%.
Regarding the hypotheses on the individual characteristics, a robust finding can again be
made: MEPs with an academic background in economics/business administration show
less sympathy towards minimum tax rates. This indicates that among parliamentarians
from these professions a more positive view towards tax competition prevails than among
parliamentarians with other professions. Out of the other individual characteristics, there
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are two which deliver significant results: MEPs who have been longer in the EP and
those who are members of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs are more
supportive of tax coordination. This indicates that those politicians with a longer indi-
vidual history of political socialization and assimilation in the European Parliament, as
well as those who – as members of the ECON – are more exposed to a European per-
spective on economic policy have a supportive position16. This supports our assumption
of a socialization effect in the EP, which suggests that the length of membership in the
Parliament and the membership in the ECON play a role in moving individual views away
from national interests towards a European perspective. Interestingly enough, this result
contrasts with Scully (2005) who doesn’t find an impact of the length of membership in
the EP on the general support for integration of a MEP.
With respect to the country characteristics, a robust significant impact of several vari-
ables can be found. In all specifications, the national corporate tax rate (measured as
CITR) has a highly significant positive impact. This confirms our assumption that mainly
representatives from high tax countries strive for mandatory minimum tax rates in order
to protect themselves against competition with their European neighbours.
One of the main predictions from standard tax competition models, i.e., that national
attitudes towards redistribution have an impact on the politicians’ attitudes towards tax
competition, can be confirmed. A positive significant impact can be observed for the
national preferences for social equality, which is in line with our assumption that tax
competition is feared in these countries because it puts pressure on the national welfare
state.
However, some further assumptions derived from tax competition models cannot be con-
firmed, namely that smaller countries are more resistant against limiting tax competition,
as well as the hypothesis that countries which benefit from agglomeration effects express
more support for minimum tax rates. Size even shows a significant negative impact in
many specifications. This might indicate that tax competition is not consistently re-
garded as beneficial in countries which are – following theoretical tax competition models
– assumed to gain from it. For the agglomeration effects, measured by the accessibility
variable which indicates potential market access, only in one case the expected positive
16Note that this effect is converse to the effect of economic expertise proxied by a final degree in
economics or business administration and that the coefficients are even similar in size. This might give
rise to concerns about multicollinearity in case that committee membership was highly correlated with
economic expertise. However, this correlation is only 13.9%, so that this concern is of minor importance.
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sign appears significantly; this effect turns out to be insignificant in all other specifica-
tions.
Finally, the hypothesis that parliamentarians from countries which do not have to fear
corporate tax competition to a high degree because of their higher share in real capital are
less supportive of minimum tax rates can be affirmed; as expected, the impact is negative
and significant for all specifications. The share of indirect taxes and other public revenues
turns out to have a negative effect on the support for minimum tax rates as expected, but
this is often not significant. Further national characteristics do not disclose a significant
effect for almost all specifications. This holds true for the national support of assigning
tax responsibilities to the EU level as well. Attempting to replace this variable with the
results of a Eurobarometer survey asking for the general attitude towards the EU did not
have a significant impact on the results, either.
In table 5, the results for the regressions of pooled answers from both German members
of the EP and the Bundestag are presented. In addition to the individual characteristics
introduced above, a further control variable is added: the origin of a parliamentarian
from the Eastern (formerly communist) part of Germany is captured by a dummy. This
is a standard procedure for analyses of German politicians’ preferences (see, e.g., Heine-
mann and Janeba (2007)), since differences in preferences regarding the economic policy
are still notable between Western and Eastern Germany as shown by Alesina and Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln (2007). However, this dummy turns out to be insignificant for all specifications.
In contrast to the findings above for the EP data, the educational background shows the
same sign, but slightly misses significance. The further individual characteristics display
insignificant results as well. Interestingly enough, the sign for the committee membership
becomes negative when the membership in the Bundestag’s committee on financial affairs
is regarded in addition to membership in the ECON. This supports the conjecture that
the positive effect found in the EP regression is indeed due to a socialization effect.
The results for the ideology characteristics are broadly in line with the previous findings.
Again, members of party groups with a more positive attitude towards European integra-
tion tend to support minimum tax rates. However, the inclusion of the economic policy
dimension renders the effect of the general left/right dimension insignificant. The taxes
vs. spending dimension itself is highly significant in all specifications. This offers further
support to the assumption that – among the many different aspects of the left/right di-
mension – it is primarily the politician’s attitude towards public spending that shapes the
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support for tax harmonization. Moreover, in specification (3) party dummies are used
with the German social democratic SPD chosen as reference category. The results con-
firm our expectation, with the economic liberal FDP and the Christian Democrats (CDU)
showing significantly less support. The strongest support for minimum tax rates comes
from the former East German communist party (Die Linke), which holds the furthest left
position in the German party spectrum; however, their coefficient does not differ signifi-
cantly from that of the SPD.
Regarding the question whether preferences differ between the EP and the Bundestag
representatives, two approaches are applied: the number of years of membership in the
EP (plus a quadratic term in order to capture a possible nonlinear relationship, specifi-
cation (1)) as well as a dummy, which has the value of one for an MEP and zero for a
member of the Bundestag (specification (2)), are tested in order to investigate whether
German politicians on the European level have different preferences. In order to allow for
differences between the political groups, interaction terms of party dummies and an EP
dummy are introduced in specifications (3) and (4).
The results of all approaches show no significant results indicating different preferences of
the EP and the Bundestag representatives. Moreover, the inclusion of interaction terms
(party dummies * EP dummy) does not provide significant results for any of the polit-
ical groups, either. Therefore, the hypothesis formulated above, namely that European
parliamentarians should be more supportive of EU-wide obligatory corporate tax rates
than representatives at the national level, cannot be confirmed by the data on German
politicians17.
17These results are similar to those of Scully (2005) who doesn’t find pronounced differences in the
attitudes towards European integration between MEPs and national delegates, either.
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7 Conclusions
This paper contributes to filling a serious gap in the tax competition literature. Instead of
treating tax policy decision-making as a black box conducted by monolithic “countries”,
we focus on important individual policy actors in the Parliaments and their preferences.
Through this political-economic approach we are able to answer the positive question
which personal characteristics and interests are the relevant drivers of harmonization pro-
cesses.
We find that ideology is indeed important, as it was anticipated: our hypotheses of the
driving motives being connected with ideology can be confirmed by the available data.
Politicians on the left side of the political spectrum offer the strongest support for the
introduction of minimum tax rates, whereas members from the right – and especially
those with a market liberal position – as well as EU-sceptical politicians tend to oppose
a harmonization. The analysis based on the measures of individual ideology positions
reveals that particularly the left-right dimension shapes the attitude towards tax harmo-
nization. Furthermore, a major influence on preferences can be ascribed to individual
characteristics, referring to the experience of the parliamentarians. It turns out that par-
liamentarians with an academic background in economics or business administration tend
to have a more positive attitude towards tax competition. Politicians with a longer mem-
bership in the EP or those who belong to the committee which deals with economic affairs
are more supportive of harmonization, which confirms our expectation of a socialization
effect.
However, in addition to individual characteristics, national interests proxied by country
indicators play an important role, as well. This is most notably the case for the cur-
rent national level of corporate taxation, which has a widespread influence. Politicians
from countries with high corporate tax burdens are highly supportive of minimum tax
rates, as this protects them against competition with other EU member states. Moreover,
one important prediction of tax competition models transpires to have an impact on the
politicians’ attitude towards tax competition, which is the citizens’ preference for social
equality. This reflects the fear of politicians from countries with a strong support for social
equality of tax competition indeed leading to a “race to the bottom” and putting pressure
on the welfare state. However, some other predictions from tax competition models seem
to play a minor role in the opinion formation process of politicians.
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Regardless of this, our EP-Bundestag comparison reveals that the relevance of institu-
tional self-interest, related to the expectation that national parliamentarians should be
afraid of losing their competencies, is not acknowledged at least for German politicians.
It is not possible to detect divergent preferences, neither on the aggregate level, nor for
any of the German parties.
Overall, our results add an important aspect to the tax competition literature which is
largely dominated by normative approaches based on welfare theory. We have been able
to show that tax harmonization preferences of real life policy makers are shaped by a
much wider spectrum of factors than theory would suggest, ranging from ideology and
individual characteristics to specific national interests. This could help explain why the
actual tax policy in Europe and elsewhere regularly follows very different avenues than
what is recommended in the public finance literature.
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Appendix
Table 6: Response rate by political group
Group Indicative ideology Number
of seats
Responses Response
rate
ALDE Liberal 104 18 17.31%
EPP-ED Conservative, Chris-
tian democracy
278 55 19.78%
GUE-NGL Socialism, commu-
nism
41 5 12.20%
IND/DEM Euroscepticism 24 7 29.17%
ITS Right-wing, nation-
alist; dissolved in
November 2007
23 4 17.39%
NI Non-attached mem-
bers
13 3 23.08%
PES Social democracy 216 50 23.15%
Greens-EFA Green, regionalism 42 6 14.29%
UEN National conser-
vatism
44 10 22.73%
Total 785 158 20.13%
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Table 7: Response rate by country
Country Number of seats Responses Response rate
AT 18 7 38.89%
BE 24 6 25.00%
BG 18 1 5.56%
CY 6 1 16.67%
CZ 24 5 20.83%
DE 99 40 40.40%
DK 14 4 28.57%
EE 6 0 0.00%
ES 54 4 7.41%
FI 14 4 28.57%
FR 78 16 20.51%
GB 78 13 16.67%
GR 24 1 4.17%
HU 24 5 20.83%
IE 13 3 23.08%
IT 78 8 10.26%
LT 13 3 23.08%
LU 6 2 33.33%
LV 9 2 22.22%
MT 5 0 0.00%
NL 27 3 11.11%
PL 54 10 18.52%
PT 24 7 29.17%
RO 35 4 11.43%
SE 19 4 21.05%
SI 7 1 14.29%
SK 14 4 28.57%
Total 785 158 20.13%
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for European Par-
liament dataset
Variable Mean Min Max Std.
Dev.
Explanations
Ideology
left/right 0.09 -0.80 0.99 0.32 “left-right” dimension measured by
Hix and Noury (forthcoming) for
individual MEPs; ranging from -1
(left) to +1 (right)
anti-/pro-Europe 0.35 -0.72 0.99 0.47 “anti-/pro-Europe policy prefer-
ences” dimension measured by
Hix and Noury (forthcoming) for
individual MEPs; ranging from -1
(anti-Europe) to +1 (pro-Europe)
Personal information
Age 52.5 30 76 10.2 Calculated as 2007 minus year of
birth
Gender 0.74 0 1 0.44 Male set at 1
Years in EP 6.82 0 28 5.86 Calculated as 2007 minus year of
first EP entry, source: official state-
ment on the EP homepage
Member of ECON
committee
0.18 0 1 0.39 Set at 1 if member of committee
on Economic and Monetary Affairs
which deals with economic and mon-
etary policies in the Union, as well
as tax provisions; source: official
statements on the EP homepage
Business/ Economic
studies
0.25 0 1 0.44 Tertiary education in business ad-
ministration or economics
Country characteristics
CITR 0.29 0.10 0.39 0.08 2006 statutory corporate income tax
rate, source: IBFD European Tax
Handbook 2006 (IBFD, 2006)
National preference
for social equality
0.37 0.23 0.54 0.07 Share of answers “Social equal-
ity and solidarity” as value which
should be preserved and reinforced
the most in our current society,
source: Special Eurobarometer 278
(European Commission (2007d))
Size 2.97 -0.92 4.41 1.42 Natural logarithm of number of in-
habitants in million, source: Euro-
stat database
GDP per capita 94.71 35.70 267.80 30.87 In PPS with EU25=100 for the year
2006, source: Eurostat database
Accessibility 91.61 4.1 203.7 55.33 Indicator calculated as the
population-weighted average of
the potential accessibility by road
of all regions within a country in
2006, EU27=100, source: ESPON
(2007)
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GVA industry 22.81 10.79 38.08 5.65 Gross value added of industry as
share of all branches in 2006 (2000
prices), source: AMECO database
EU-15 member 0.73 0 1 0.45 Old members of EU (EU15) set at
1, others at 0
Other revenues 0.31 0.22 0.38 0.04 Total current revenue minus current
taxes on income and wealth, share
of GDP for 2006, source: European
Commission (2007c)
National preference
for taxation
0.28 0.09 0.45 0.08 Share of answers who think that
decisions in the area of taxation
should be made jointly within the
European Union, Source: Euro-
barometer 67 European Commis-
sion (2007a))
Number of observations: 156
Source: European Parliament if no other source is named.
39
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for combined
dataset
Variable Mean Min Max Std.
Dev.
Explanations
Ideology
left/right (party) 10.42 3.6 13.6 3.78 “left-right” dimension measured by
Benoit and Laver (2006) for national
parties; ranging from -20 (left) to
+20 (right)
anti-/pro-Europe
(party)
9.74 6.9 10.8 1.36 “anti-/pro-Europe policy prefer-
ences” dimension measured by
Benoit and Laver (2006) for na-
tional parties; ranging from -20
(anti-Europe) to +20 (pro-Europe)
Taxes vs. spending
(party)
12.09 3.00 18.70 4.95 “taxes vs. spending” dimension;
measured by Benoit and Laver
(2006) for national parties ranging
from 0 (high spending) to 20 (low
taxes).
ALDE/FDP 0.18 0 1 0.39 Affiliation with ALDE or FDP set
at 1, all other set at 0
EPP-ED/CDU 0.37 0 1 0.49 Affiliation with EPP-ED or
CDU/CSU set at 1, all other
set at 0
GUE-NGL/Linke 0.15 0 1 0.36 Affiliation with GUE-NGL or Die
Linke set at 1, all other set at 0
Greens-EFA/Die
Gru¨nen
0.08 0 1 0.27 Affiliation with Greens-EFA or
Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen set at 1, all
other set at 0
Personal information
Age 49.7 23 69 9.8 Calculated as 2007 minus year of
birth
Gender 0.68 0 1 0.47 Male set at 1
Business/ Economic
studies
0.20 0 1 0.40 Tertiary education in business ad-
ministration or economics
Member of ECON
committee / Finan-
zausschuss
0.19 0 1 0.40 Set at 1 if MEP and member of com-
mittee on Economic and Monetary
Affairs which deals with economic
and monetary policies in the Union,
as well as tax provisions, or if mem-
ber of the Bundestag and member of
the Finanzausschuss; source: official
statements on the EP homepage
Eastern Germany 0.20 0 1 0.40 Set at 1 if elected in an eastern ger-
man constituency
Years in EP 1.73 0 28 4.42 Calculated as 2007 minus year of
first EP entry, source: official state-
ment on the EP homepage
EP Dummy 0.20 0 1 0.40 Set at 1 if MEP
Number of observations: 194; Source: European Parliament or Bundestag if no other source is named.
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